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Altering the Deal: The Importance of GSE
Shareholder Litigation
I. INTRODUCTION
“I am altering the deal. Pray I don’t alter it any further.”1 Ever
the classical villain, the Star Wars saga’s Darth Vader informs Lando
Calrissian that the princess and the Chewbacca are now his.2 The lesson
gleaned from the short exchange is simple: Deals struck with despots
are not deals at all. Darth Vader’s words likely resonate in the ears of
private investors in the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie
Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie
Mac”), (collectively, the “GSEs”).3 Perry Capital LLC (“Perry”) and
other private investors in the GSEs are currently embroiled in a legal
battle against the federal government in connection with the
conservatorship of the GSEs.4 Their claims, in essence, are that
agencies of the federal government have impermissibly decided to “alter
the deal,” and that the deal should be undone.5
Now on appeal after being dismissed in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia,6 Perry’s lawsuit against the
THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK (Lucasfilm 1982).
Id.
The term “Government Sponsored Enterprises,” or “GSEs,” may refer to other
companies “born from statutory charters issued by Congress,” such as the Federal Home
Loan Bank. Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 13-1025, 2014 WL 4829559, at *1 n.1 (D.D.C.
Sept. 30, 2014). For the purposes of this Note, the term “GSEs” will refer to Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac exclusively.
4. See Margaret Cronin Fisk et al., Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Investors Lose Suits
(Oct.
1,
2014,
12:01
AM),
Over
Lost
Dividends,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-30/Fannie Mae-Freddie Mac-investor-suits-overtreasury-dividend-thrown-out.html (noting Perry’s suit is “among . . . almost 20 related
cases . . . filed by investors”).
5. See Nathan Vardi, Why Hedge Funds Suing the Government over Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac
Have a Bad Case, FORBES (July 15, 2013, 9:50 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2013/07/15/why-hedge-funds-suing-thegovernment-over-Fannie Mae-and-Freddie Mac-have-a-bad-case; Complaint and Prayer for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶ 16, Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 13-1025 (D.D.C.
July 7, 2013) [hereinafter Complaint] (noting that the plaintiff “seeks to prevent Defendants
from giving effect to or enforcing the so-called Third Amendment”).
6. Notice of Appeal, Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 13-1025 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 2014).
1.
2.
3.
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United States Treasury (the “Treasury”) and the Federal Housing
Finance Agency (the “FHFA”), (collectively, the “Government”) is but
one example of current litigation brought by private investors in
connection with the GSEs.7 These cases, sometimes referred to
collectively as “dividend sweep litigation,”8 stem from a 2012
amendment (the “Third Amendment”) to the Senior Preferred Stock
Purchase Agreements (“PSPAs”).9 The plaintiffs in these cases
challenge the validity of the Third Amendment because, they claim, the
changes it wrought to the PSPAs negatively impact the value of private
stock in the GSEs.10
Perry’s suit in district court against the FHFA and the Treasury
specifically focused on administrative law arguments against the
enforcement of the Third Amendment to the PSPAs.11 Perry relied
almost entirely on alleged violations of the Administrative Procedure
Act (“APA”)12 to seek the nullification of the Third Amendment.13 As
presaged in dicta of the district court’s opinion,14 the climate in which
the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (“HERA”)15 was
passed and the broad discretion it affords the FHFA when acting as
conservator renders these claims difficult to make.
It is the overarching goal of this Note to provide a broad
framework for understanding the issues at stake in current dividend

7. See Fisk et al., supra note 4 (noting that “Bruce Berkowitz, the head of Fairholme
Capital Management LLC,” and “[h]edge-fund manager Bill Ackman’s Pershing Square
Capital Management LP” are among those involved in various suits challenging the Third
Amendment).
8. The phrase “dividend sweep litigation,” as it appears in this Note, refers
collectively to the various lawsuits against the federal government in connection with the
Third Amendment.
9. Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 16.
10. Id.
11. See id. ¶¶ 59–94 (enumerating four administrative law grounds on which the court
should grant relief).
12. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. 404-79, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as
codified by An Act to enact Title 5, United States Code, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378
(1996), as amended through Pub. L. No. 107-245, 116 Stat. 1504 (2002) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012)).
13. Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 95.
14. See Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 13-1025, 2014 WL 4829559, at *2–3 (D.D.C.
Sept. 30, 2014) (quoting HERA’s broad empowering language and the emergency nature of
the sub-prime mortgage crisis).
15. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122
Stat. 2654 (2008) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1455, 1719, 4511, 4513 & 4617
(2012)); Vardi, supra note 5.
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sweep litigation against the Government. Specifically, this Note asserts
that although Perry and similarly situated plaintiffs bringing APA-based
actions rightfully question the Government’s reasoning in entering the
Third Amendment, HERA’s anti-injunction provision16 presents what is
likely an insurmountable jurisdiction problem for dividend sweep
litigation plaintiffs. This Note proceeds in four parts. Part II provides a
general background of the GSEs’ history, role in the secondary
mortgage market, and path to conservatorship.17 Part III summarizes
the arguments Perry and other plaintiffs made in district court,18 while
Part IV discusses why these claims failed in district court and why
HERA’s anti-injunction provision successfully insulates
the
Government from virtually all judicial review from APA-based
claims.19 Part V concludes by discussing the negative implications of
insulating the Third Amendment from review by using HERA’s antiinjunction provision.20
II. THE GSES’ ROAD TO CONSERVATORSHIP

A.

Fannie Mae and Freddie: A Brief History

The mission of the GSEs is to provide liquidity and stability to
the mortgage industry by purchasing, guaranteeing, and securitizing
mortgage loans from loan originators to sell on the secondary market.21
Fannie Mae was formed in 1938 under U.S. Government charter and
privatized in 1968.22 Freddie Mac was formed in 1970 under the
umbrella of the Federal Home Loan Banks and became fully privatized
in 1989.23 When banks sell long-term mortgages in the secondary
market for securitization, the asset (a thirty year fixed rate mortgage, for

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

12 U.S.C. § 4617(f).
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
Avni P. Patel, The Bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 28 REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 21, 22 (2009).
22. Id.
23. Julie Andersen Hill, Shifting Losses: The Impact of Fannie Mae’s and Freddie
Mac’s Conservatorships on Commercial Banks, 35 HAMLINE L. REV. 343, 350 (2012).
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example) is converted into cash.24 This sale reduces the bank’s
exposure to interest rate and default risks.25 By providing a ready-made
market for long-term streams of payment, the secondary mortgage
market increases loan originators’ liquidity and removes the long-term
interest rate and default risks associated with holding a typical mortgage
loan to maturity—all of which increase the availability of home
mortgage loans.26 The GSEs’ role in the U.S. housing market is
paramount. When the GSEs were put into conservatorship in
September 2008, they collectively “owned or guaranteed more than $5
trillion in residential mortgages.”27
Because of pressure by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (“HUD”) to increase mortgage loan availability for lowerincome borrowers, the GSEs purchased increasing levels of subprime
loans made by originators in the years leading up to 2007.28 Once
subprime mortgage defaults reached a feverish pace in late 2007, private
investors lost confidence in the GSEs and began to sell GSE stock en
masse.29 In 2008, Congress passed HERA as a response to the subprime
mortgage crisis.30 HERA provides the statutory basis for the FHFA to
place Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into either conservatorship or
receivership.31 According to Perry, “[b]efore the FHFA placed the
Companies into conservatorship, [the] Treasury . . . encouraged private
investors to purchase Private Sector Preferred Stock.”32

Patel, supra note 21, at 22–23.
See LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL
SERVICE ACTIVITIES 329–33 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing how the sale of mortgage loans by
loan originators to securitizers like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac allows banks and other
loan originators to reduce the risk that market rates paid to depositors might exceed fixed
rates earned on long-term mortgages).
26. See Patel, supra note 21, at 22 (noting that “[a]fter banks and other loan originators
sell mortgages to [the GSEs], they use profits to make new loans,” and that “[these] loans
increase liquidity and flexibility in the housing market”).
27. Hill, supra note 23, at 344.
28. Patel, supra note 21, at 23 (noting that “HUD required [the GSEs] to purchase
‘affordable’ loans made available to . . . low and middle-income buyers”).
29. Id. at 24–25.
30. Id. at 24; Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The
Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 484–85 (2009).
31. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), Pub. L. No. 110-289,
122 Stat. 2654 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1455, 1719, 4511, 4513 & 4617
(2012)).
32. Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 39.
24.
25.
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The GSEs Enter into the Original PSPA

On September 7, 2008, the Treasury exercised its new grant of
authority to place the GSEs into conservatorship and execute the
original PSPAs as a means of ensuring their solvency when it deemed
their recapitalization efforts woefully inadequate.33 As a result, the
GSEs have been wards of the state ever since.
The conservatorships of the GSEs are structured so that the
FHFA runs the firms in place of their previous executive leadership, and
negotiates with the Treasury on behalf of the GSEs for the terms of the
PSPAs.34 The GSEs were given an extension of an initial $100 billion
(later extended to $200 billion)35 line of credit immediately after they
were placed into conservatorship under the FHFA.36 This “bailout” of
sorts was effected through an initial agreement that the Treasury would
buy all of the newly-created senior preferred stock for a nominal price
of $1 billion.37 If at any time the FHFA determined that Fannie Mae or
Freddie Mac’s liabilities exceed its assets, “[the] Treasury [would]
contribute cash capital to the GSE in an amount equal to the difference
between liabilities and assets” and that amount “[would] be added to the
senior preferred stock.”38 In return for access to this liquidity, the senior
preferred stock would earn a 10% annual dividend, and the Treasury
would receive warrants for the purchase of 79.9% of Fannie Mae or
Freddie Mac’s common stock at a nominal price.39 In the event Fannie
Mae or Freddie Mac was unable to pay the 10% dividend on the value
of the senior preferred stock, the dividend rate would rise to 12%
annually which would accrue until the GSE could resume payment of
the dividend.40 This draw and dividend structure was meant to quickly
infuse the GSEs with cash and assuage “widespread concern that the
Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 30, at 486.
Patel, supra note 21, at 25–26.
See Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 13-1025, 2014 WL 4829559, at *3 (D.D.C.
Sept. 30, 2014) (“On May 6, 2009, Treasury and the GSEs, through [the] FHFA . . . doubled
its funding cap to $200 billion for each GSE.”).
36. Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep’t Office of Pub. Affairs, Fact Sheet: Treasury
Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement (Sept. 7, 2008), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Documents/pspa_factsheet_090708%20hp1128.pdf.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
33.
34.
35.
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[GSEs] were insolvent.”41
Conservators are meant “to conduct an institution as an ongoing
business.”42 As such, Perry argued that the FHFA was required to run
the GSEs in a manner consistent with securing their future as private
firms.43 Indeed, Perry argued that the FHFA is “strictly limited by
HERA” in its role as conservator.44
C.

The FHFA and the Treasury Enter into the Third Amendment

Entered into by the FHFA as conservator for the GSEs, and the
Treasury as holder of the senior preferred stock on August 17, 2012,45
the Third Amendment was the genesis of the dividend sweep litigation.
The Third Amendment drastically changed the nature of the
relationships between the GSEs, the Treasury, and the FHFA by erasing
the prior 10% dividend of the government preferred stock and instead
“sweeps” all profits over a certain threshold to the Treasury.46 These
new dividend payments made to the Treasury are calculated by
subtracting the “Applicable Capital Reserve Amount”47 from any
positive net worth generated by the GSEs in each quarter.48 Every net
worth dollar the GSEs generate above that reserve amount is paid to the

41. DAVID H. CARPENTER & M. MAUREEN MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34657,
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION INSOLVENCY: FEDERAL AUTHORITY OVER FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE
MAC, AND DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 2 (2008).
42. Resolution Trust Corp. v. CedarMinn Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 956 F.2d 1446, 1454 (8th
Cir. 1992) (drawing the distinction between the roles of conservators and receivers).
43. See Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 81 (“HERA requires the FHFA to take steps to put
[the GSEs] in a sound and solvent condition and to work to conserve [their] assets and
property.” (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted)).
44. Id.
45. Third Amendment to Amended and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase
Agreement between U.S. Dep’t of Treasury and Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. 1, 8 (Aug.
17,
2012),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1026214/
000119312512359938/d398152dex101.htm.
46. See id. at 4 (replacing the “Dividend Rate” of 10.0% after December 31, 2012 with
the “Dividend Amount,” defined as “the amount, if any, by which the Net Worth
Amount . . . less the Applicable Capital Reserve Amount exceeds zero”).
47. The “Applicable Capital Reserve Amount” is the amount of capital per quarter that
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are permitted to retain. This capital reserve amount is
decreased from $3 billion per quarter in 2013 to $0 by January 1, 2018, such that Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac are permitted to retain a maximum of $12 billion in 2013, $9.6 billion
in 2014, $7.2 billion in 2015, $4.8 billion in 2016, $2.4 billion in 2017, and $0 beginning in
2018. Id.
48. Id.
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Treasury as a dividend on the existing senior preferred stock.49 Thus,
the GSEs are barred from building any capital, save the nominal reserve
amounts,50 and operate as indentured servants to the Treasury.
The Government’s cited reason for entering into the Third
Amendment was the growing concern over the “circularity of
payments”51 death spiral that might ensue when an unprofitable GSE
would be forced to draw funds from the Treasury to meet the 10%
interest payments on existing Treasury-held senior preferred stock.52
This would have the effect of increasing the GSEs’ dividend obligations
because the draw amount would be added to the liquidation preference
amount that would accrue interest at 10%.53 According to the Treasury
and the FHFA, this cycle of paying 10% dividends to the Treasury with
additional draws from the Treasury had the potential to exhaust the
Treasury’s lending limit of $200 billion.54 Creating this negative
feedback loop of borrowing funds from the Treasury to pay the interest
charges on other Treasury draws could potentially spiral the GSEs into
insolvency.55
The Government claimed that the Third Amendment was a
reasonable way to ensure that neither Fannie Mae nor Freddie Mac
could exhaust their access to capital, given that the purpose of the
PSPAs was to instill market confidence in the GSEs.56 If the FHFA
were to permit Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac to exhaust their funding
commitments, it would send strong market signals that that GSE was in
a precarious position—unable to turn to the government for any
additional cash.57 Although that stated concern may seem reasonable,
Id.
The reserve amount of capital that the GSEs are permitted to retain, assuming a
positive net worth is generated, is decreased annually until it reaches $0 in 2018, at which
point neither Fannie Mae nor Freddie Mac are permitted to retain any positive earnings. Id.
51. Treasury Defendant’s Reply in Support of Their Dispositive Motions and
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Motions at 43, Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No.
13-1025, (D.D.C. May 2, 2014) [hereinafter Treasury Reply].
52. Treasury Reply, supra note 51, at 43–47.
53. Id. at 43.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 44–45 (claiming the Third Amendment was necessary because of “the
need to maintain investor confidence in the GSEs by minimizing those entities’ draws on the
finite Treasury funds available to them”).
56. Id.
57. See id. (arguing that the Government had a duty to calm and reassure the mortgagebacked securities market that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were healthy and that, with this
chief concern in mind, the Third Amendment was abundantly reasonable).
49.
50.
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plaintiffs in all dividend sweep litigation cases fundamentally disagree
about the necessity and legitimacy of the Third Amendment.
The concerns that the GSEs’ lack of profitability might
precipitate a negative feedback loop became moot when the two
mortgage giants returned to consistent profitability in the quarters
following the Third Amendment’s enactment.58 After drawing a final
$20 million in the first quarter of 2012, Freddie Mac has paid the
Treasury approximately $91 billion of the Treasury’s $71 billion
investment—a return of 128%.59 Fannie Mae has paid the Treasury
approximately $134.5 billion of the Treasury’s $116.1 billion
investment—a return of 115%.60 Combined, the GSEs have returned
approximately $225 billion to the Treasury for the Treasury’s $188
billion commitment—a return of approximately 119% to the U.S.
taxpayers.61 Fannie Mae’s news release succinctly sums up the issue:
“Fannie Mae will have paid a total of $134.5 billion in dividends to
[the] Treasury in comparison to $116.1 billion in draw requests since
2008. Dividend payments do not reduce prior Treasury draws.”62
Perhaps unsurprisingly, investors in private preferred stock and
common stock of the GSEs filed a slew of civil actions containing
various claims against the Government in 2013.63 Perry’s suit focused
58. See FREDDIE MAC, UPDATE: INVESTOR PRESENTATION 12–13 (Dec. 2014)
[hereinafter FREDDIE MAC UPDATE], available at
http://www.Freddie Macmac.com/investors/pdffiles/investor-presentation.pdf (showing
profitable quarters since 3Q12 with zero Treasury draw requests since 1Q12 for
approximately $20 million); Press Release, Fannie Mae, Fannie Mae Reports Largest Net
Income in Company History; $17.2 Billion for 2012 and $7.6 Billion for Fourth Quarter
2012 10 (Apr. 2, 2013) [hereinafter Fannie Mae Report 4Q12], available at
http://www.Fanniemae.com/resources/file/ir/pdf/quarterly-annualresults/2012/q42012_release.pdf (showing profitable quarters in 3Q and 4Q12, immediately
following the Third Amendment).
59. See FREDDIE MAC UPDATE, supra note 58, at 13.
60. See Press Release, Fannie Mae, Fannie Mae Reports Net Income of $3.9 billion
and Comprehensive Income $4.0 billion for Third Quarter 2014 1 (Nov. 6, 2014)
[hereinafter Fannie Mae Report 3Q14], available at http://www.Fanniemae.com/
resources/file/ir/pdf/quarterly-annual-results/2014/q32014_release.pdf.
61. Freddie Mac’s $91 billion and Fannie Mae’s $134 billion combine to $225 billion.
Dividing that figure by the government’s total funding commitment of $188 billion yields
119%.
62. Fannie Mae Report 3Q14, supra note 60, at 1.
63. See Fisk et al., supra note 4 (noting that Perry’s suit is “among the first of almost
20 related cases to be decided”); Press Release, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac Investors File Suit Challenging U.S. Treasury’s 2012 “Sweep Amendment”
(July 7, 2013) (on file with author) (announcing the filing of a suit against the federal
government to nullify the Third Amendment as illegal).
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on the administrative law aspects of the actions of the FHFA and the
Treasury, arguing that the Third Amendment should be vacated.64
According to Perry, the administrative agencies essentially abused their
statutory powers and strayed from HERA’s mandate by extracting
billions from the mortgage giants before winding them down and
creating a world without the GSEs.65
D.

Parallel Litigation Underway

Although the approximately twenty lawsuits all spring from the
same set of facts—the enactment of the Third Amendment—groups
holding stock in the GSEs have taken a number of different approaches
to attacking the validity of the Third Amendment.66 All combined, the
lawsuits take five general approaches in respect to their substantive
claims: (1) administrative law arguments that the Government exceeded
its statutory authority, (2) administrative law arguments that the
Government acted arbitrarily and capriciously when entering into the
Third Amendment, (3) constitutional arguments that the United States
effected a taking of property from the private preferred and common
stockholders, (4) breach of contractual agreement, and (5) breach of
fiduciary duty owed to the private preferred stock and common
stockholders.67

See Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 95.
See Plaintiffs Perry Capital LLC, Fairholme Funds, Inc., Fairholme Fund, Berkley
Ins. Co., Acadia Ins. Co., Admiral Indem. Co., Admiral Ins. Co., Berkley Reg’l Ins. Co.,
Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., Midwest Emp’s Cas. Ins. Co., Nautilus Ins. Co., Preferred Emp’s
Ins. Co., Arrowood Indem. Co., Arrowood Surplus Lines Ins. Co., and Fin. Structures Ltd.
Reply in Support of their Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on Administrative
Procedure Act Claims at 1–2, Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 13-1025 (D.D.C. June 2,
2014) [hereinafter Plaintiffs Reply].
66. See Todd Sullivan, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac: The WSJ Misinterprets Sweeney
Decision, VALUEPLAYS (Sept. 24, 2014, 6:01 PM),
http://www.valueplays.net/2014/09/24/wsj-misinterprets-sweeney-decision (noting that
“[t]here is a reason many of these are separate actions, the cases and arguments being made
are not the same”). Mr. Sullivan correctly notes the dangers in drawing parallels from
results in other cases against the government because the nature of the arguments differ
based on the plaintiff and the particular arguments each makes. Id.
67. See Consolidated Class Action and Derivative Plaintiffs’ Omnibus Memorandum
of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Consolidated Amended Class
Action and Derivative Complaint, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 20–37,
In Re Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement Class Action
Litigations, No. 13-1288 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2014) (making arguments based on the commonlaw of contracts, fiduciary duties, and takings claims); Complaint, supra note 5.
64.
65.
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III. PERRY’S CASE
At the pleading stage of the case in district court, Perry made
administrative law arguments against the Treasury68 and against the
FHFA69 in an attempt to invalidate the Third Amendment and revive the
value of the private preferred stock.70 On September 30, 2014,
however, the district court ruled in favor of the Government on motions
to dismiss Perry’s case71 along with lawsuits brought by Fairholme
Funds,72 Arrowood Indemnity Company,73 and a class of litigants
represented by Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP74 (collectively, the
“Plaintiffs”). The four suits made many similar and overlapping
arguments.75 The dismissal surprised many interested in the litigation,
because the case was dismissed while the Government was still
compiling their administrative records, before either party had presented
oral arguments on motions, before discovery, and before trial.76
Although the Plaintiffs’ claims in these four cases failed before
they were advanced at trial, the basic substance of their arguments
warrants examination as several plaintiffs filed notices of appeal
immediately following the dismissal.77 These arguments are useful as a
68. See Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶ 68, 73 (claiming that the Treasury exceeded its
statutory authority under HERA and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the
APA).
69. See id. ¶¶ 87, 94 (claiming that the FHFA violated its statutory mandate to preserve
and conserve the GSEs and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the APA).
70. See id. ¶ 1; Vardi, supra note 15.
71. Order at 2–3, Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 13-1025 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2014).
72. Consolidated Amended Class Action and Derivative Complaint, Fairholme Funds,
Inc. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, No. 13-1053 (D.D.C. July 10, 2013).
73. Complaint, Arrowood Indem. Co. v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 13-1439
(D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2013).
74. Consolidated Amended Class Action and Derivative Compliant, In Re Fannie
Mae/Freddie Mac Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement Class Action Litigations, No.
13-1288 (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 2013).
75. Order, supra note 71, at 2. Several of the motions and accompanying memoranda
were written and filed jointly. See Plaintiffs Reply, supra note 65, (filing three separate
actions and case numbers together for the fifty-one page memorandum of law).
76. See Richard Epstein, The WSJ’s Improbable Defense of Judge Lamberth’s
Indefensible Decision in Perry Capital, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2014, 1:49 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardepstein/2014/10/02/godzilla-versus-the-thing-the-wallstreet-journals-improbable-defense-of-judge-lamberths-indefensible-decision-in-perrycapital.
77. Joe Light, Fairholme Funds to Appeal Dismissal of Fannie, Freddie Suit, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 10, 2014, 10:23 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fairholme-funds-to-appealdismissal-of-fannie-freddie-suit-1412950991 (noting that Fairholme Funds, Inc. and Perry
Capital, LLC had filed notices of appeal from the District Court’s decision).
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representative sample of the APA-based dividend sweep litigation
arguments.
Perry used a two-pronged approach to attack the Treasury’s
78
actions. Perry claimed that the Treasury violated the APA by
exceeding its statutory authority under HERA and that the Treasury
acted “arbitrarily and capriciously” when it entered into the Third
Amendment.79
A.

The Government Lacked Statutory Authority

Under the APA, a court can “hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions” if they are “in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.”80
Perry relied on this
administrative law statute to provide the legal mechanism for
invalidating the Treasury’s actions, because the Treasury is an agency
subject to the APA.81 HERA empowers the Treasury to purchase
securities in the GSEs to make them solvent.82 It also limits the time in
which the Treasury may purchase those securities or advance them
additional funds.83 HERA explicitly limits the Treasury’s power to
“hold, exercise any rights received in connection with, or sell, any
obligations or securities purchased” after December 31, 2009.84 Perry’s
argument was simply that by amending the stock certificates through
the Third Amendment in 2012, the Treasury materially altered the
securities in such a way that it amounts to a “purchase” of securities
long after its authority to do so had expired.85
According to Perry, the Treasury “did not exercise any right” to

78. See Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶ 68, 73, 87, 94 (making two APA-based arguments
against each defendant—that they exceeded their statutory authority, and that they acted
arbitrarily and capriciously).
79. See id. ¶¶ 64, 68, 73, 78.
80. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2012).
81. Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 68.
82. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)
(2012) (granting the FHFA the authority to “[o]perate the [GSE]” and “provide by contract
for assistance in fulfilling any function, activity, action, or duty of the [FHFA] as
conservator or receiver.” Id. This provision, when coupled with the FHFA’s mandate to
conserve the GSE’s assets is the basis on which the FHFA finds authority to contract with
the Treasury to ensure the GSEs are solvent.
83. §§ 1455(l)(4), 1719(g)(4).
84. § 1719(g)(2)(D).
85. See Plaintiffs Reply, supra note 65, at 18–26.
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which it was entitled under the terms of the PSPAs.86 Perry argued that
the power to amend the PSPAs was not a “right [the] Treasury received
that could be exercised after December 31, 2009.”87 In response, the
Treasury, in essence, argued that the right to amend the PSPAs was a
contractual right contained in the original PSPAs.88 The Treasury
claimed that the right to amend the PSPAs survived the expiration of the
right to purchase securities in the GSEs at the end of 2009.89 In that
case, the Third Amendment would simply be the exercise of that right
“received in connection with”90 the original PSPAs.91 Perry responded
by asserting that the Treasury’s right to amend the PSPAs vanished at
the stroke of midnight on December 31, 2009, at which point the
Treasury was left only with whatever stock it had purchased up to that
date.92
Perry then asserted that the Treasury changed the nature of the
stock it owned in the GSEs by executing the total net worth sweep and
that the “fundamental change” securities law doctrine should render the
amendment an illegal purchase of securities.93 This doctrine represents
an exception to the default rule for bringing a securities fraud action
under § 10(b).94 Under that provision, “a plaintiff [must] be an actual
‘purchaser’ or ‘seller’ of securities who has been injured by deception
or fraud ‘in connection with’ the purchase or sale.”95
The fundamental change doctrine provides a cause of action for
plaintiffs to bring a securities fraud claim when the default rule’s
technical requirement of a purchase or sale is not met.96 When a
plaintiff experiences a drastic and unintentional change in the nature of
a security, courts will deem the holder of that security to have
effectively purchased or sold it.97 Perry used this narrow exception to
86. Id. at 18.
87. Id. at 18–20.
88. Treasury Reply, supra note 51, at 28.
89. Id. at 27–28.
90. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), 12 U.S.C. § 1719(g)(2)(D)

(2012).
91. See Treasury Reply, supra note 51, at 26–29 (arguing that amending the PSPAs
was a permissible exercise of rights not subject to the Sunset Provision).
92. See Plaintiffs Reply, supra note 65, at 19.
93. Id. at 20–22.
94. 7547 Corp. v. Parker & Parsley Dev. Partners, L.P., 38 F.3d 211, 226 (1994).
95. Id. (citing Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 226–27.
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define the term “purchase” to establish that the change in the GSEs’
stock resulting from the Third Amendment was a “purchase” made after
the Treasury’s express authority to do so had expired.98 This securities
law doctrine and a common sense understanding of the word
“purchase,” Perry argued, means that the Treasury bought rights after its
authority to do so had expired.99
Perry also argued that the FHFA, because of its special role as
the GSEs’ conservator, had a “statutory responsibility to ensure each
[GSE] ‘operates in a safe and sound manner.’ ”100 The FHFA owed a
special duty as the GSEs’ conservator to protect and conserve them as
private, ongoing businesses.101 According to Perry, agreeing to
surrender all company net worth was antithetical to the FHFA’s role in
protecting the GSEs and their shareholders.102 Perry alleged that
Congress “requires [the] FHFA . . . to preserve and conserve the
[GSEs’] assets and place [them] in a sound and solvent condition.”103
In other words, preventing the companies from retaining or building
capital could not logically further the goal of reestablishing the GSEs as
private firms—a goal that necessarily required the GSEs to buy back the
government preferred shares.104
B.

The Government Acted Arbitrarily and Capriciously

Perry’s second line of argument comes from the “arbitrary and
capricious” provision of the APA.105 Pursuant to the APA, a court may
Plaintiff’s Reply, supra note 65, at 22.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 29 (quoting News Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, A Strategic Plan for
Enterprise Conservatorships: The Next Chapter in a Story that Needs an Ending 7 (Feb. 21,
2012)).
101. See id.
102. See id. at 2–3 (claiming that “FHFA’s contentions that the [Third Amendment] is
consistent with its conservatorship authority . . . fall flat,” and that the Third Amendment
“renders those goals [of preserving the GSEs assets for normal resumption of business]
impossible”).
103. Id. (citing Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), 12 U.S.C. §
4617(b)(2)(D) (2012)) (internal quotation omitted).
104. As part of the original agreement with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, new
“Treasury Senior Preferred Stock” was created to provide the mechanism for funding Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac. See Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep’t Office of Pub. Affairs, supra
note 36. Those shares have an outstanding value of $189.5 billion—an amount that would
need to be satisfied in order for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to repurchase those shares and
resume normal operations.
105. Plaintiffs Reply, supra note 65, at 39.
98.
99.
100.
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invalidate “agency action, findings, and conclusions” found to be
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.”106
As articulated in Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.,107 the test for challenging an agency action as “arbitrary and
capricious” turns on whether the action is the product of “reasoned
decisionmaking.”108 Although judicial review under this standard is
deferential to the agency, courts still require that the agency “examine
the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action
including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.’ ”109 Based on this standard, Perry argued that the Treasury and
the FHFA “failed to consider factors required by Congress, [] failed to
take into account the agencies’ prior explanations of their statutory
authority,” “failed to engage in reasoned decisionmaking,” and “clearly
breached their fiduciary duties” in entering into the Third
Amendment.110
Perry asserted that the administrative record provided by the
Treasury does not provide the congressionally required explanation for
why the Third Amendment was consistent with the plan for the GSEs to
resume operations as a private entity.111 According to Perry, this lack of
a record demonstrates that neither the Treasury nor the FHFA can
justify the Third Amendment in light of its mandate to revive and
release the GSEs.112
Perry further argued that although “[a]n agency’s predictive
judgments may be entitled to some deference . . . no deference is owed
to predictions that are contradicted by the record.”113 Perry’s claim
was, again, simple: The data available at the time of the Third
Amendment clearly showed a healthier future for both of the GSEs,
rendering the Third Amendment unnecessary for the mortgage giants.114
106. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
107. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
108. Id. at 52.
109. Id. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168

(1962)).
110. Plaintiffs Reply, supra note 65, at 39.
111. Id. at 39–40.
112. See id.
113. Id. (emphasis added) (citing BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. FCC, 469 F.3d 1052,

1060 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
114. Id. at 41.
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The final avenue of argument on the arbitrary and capricious
theory is that the Treasury, as the majority shareholder in the GSEs,
breached its fiduciary duty to the private preferred and common
stockholders by entering into the Third Amendment.115 Independent of
any contractual-based theory, the Treasury and the FHFA owed
fiduciary duties to the private shareholders in the companies the FHFA
was supposed to be rehabilitating—duties they breached.116
IV. WHY PERRY LOST AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF HERA’S ANTIINJUNCTION PROVISION
Perry’s claims failed in district court for one reason: HERA’s
anti-injunction provision, contained in 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f), bars judicial
review of any action that “restrain[s] or affect[s]”117 the FHFA in
conserving the assets of the GSEs, as long as it acts within its statutory
authority.118 To escape that provision’s reach and expose the
Government to judicial review requires evidence that the Government
exceeded its statutory authority.119
The district court found that HERA clearly grants broad powers
to the FHFA to act in furtherance of its conservator objectives,120 and
that HERA’s anti-injunction provision prevents judicial review of all
equitable claims against the FHFA when acting pursuant to its statutory

See id. at 46–48.
Memorandum of Law of Plaintiffs Perry Capital LLC, Fairholme Funds, Inc.,
Fairholme Fund, Berkley Ins. Co., Acadia Ins. Co., Admiral Indem. Co., Admiral Ins. Co.,
Berkley Reg’l Ins. Co., Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., Midwest Emp’s Cas. Ins. Co., Nautilus Ins.
Co., Preferred Emp’s Ins. Co., Arrowood Indem. Co., Arrowood Surplus Lines Ins. Co., and
Fin. Structures Ltd. in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and Motions for
Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on
Administrative Procedure Act Claims at 85–88, Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 13-1025
(D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2014).
117. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f)
(2012).
118. See Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 13-1025, 2014 WL 4829559, at *6 (D.D.C.
Sept. 30, 2014) (explaining that twenty-four of the thirty-seven claims brought by the five
groups of litigants seek a type of relief that is effectively barred).
119. See id. at *6, 8 (explaining that dismissal is proper if the plaintiffs fail to
“sufficiently plead that the FHFA acted beyond the scope of its statutory [authority]” as
conservator which would require a purchase of securities).
120. See 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(1)(D) (stating that “[the FHFA] may, as conservator, take
action as may be—(i) necessary to put the [GSE] in a sound and solvent condition; and (ii)
appropriate to carry on the business of the [GSE] and preserve the assets and property of the
[GSE]”).
115.
116.
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authority.121 In addition to the broad protections for the FHFA from
judicial review of “the exercise of [its] powers or functions . . . as a
conservator,”122 the Treasury’s authority is afforded the protections of
the anti-injunction provision because “granting relief against the
counterparty to a contract with [the] FHFA would directly restrain [the]
FHFA’s ability as a conservator vis-à-vis that contract.”123 In short, the
court’s principal inquiry is whether the Government was acting within
its statutory authority.124 If so, then HERA’s anti-injunction provision
bars all claims seeking non-monetary relief.125
A.

The District Court’s Dismissal

In the court’s memorandum opinion supporting the dismissal of
Plaintiffs’ cases, Judge Lamberth details the pertinent background
information for the cases, the applicable legal standard on a motion to
dismiss, and the analysis for why the various plaintiffs’ claims failed.126
In a few short pages,127 Judge Lamberth found that HERA’s antiinjunction provision: “bars claims of arbitrary and capricious
conduct,”128 and “applies to Treasury’s authority.”129 He further found
that the “Treasury . . . did not violate [its] authority” under HERA,130
and that the “FHFA acted within its statutory authority.”131
HERA’s anti-injunction provision states in pertinent part, “no
court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or

121.
122.
123.
124.

Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *6.
12 U.S.C. § 4617(f).
Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *7 (citing Treasury Reply, supra note 51, at 12–13).
Id. at *6 (citing previous D.C. Circuit decisions on agency review and noting that
“the question for this Court is whether the plaintiffs sufficiently plead that [the Government]
acted beyond the scope of its ‘statutory powers or functions’ ”); Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc. v. FHFA, 815 F. Supp. 2d 630, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that “the critical question”
in determining if § 4617(f) “precludes this Court from exercising jurisdiction” is “whether
the FHFA’s [action] constitutes an exercise of a conservatorship power or function”).
125. Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *6 (noting that a failure to plead that the Government
exceeded its powers, “the Court must dismiss all of the [plaintiffs’] claims for declaratory,
injunctive, or other equitable relief”).
126. Id. at *1–25.
127. Id. at *7–12.
128. Id. at *7.
129. Id.
130. Id. at *9.
131. Id.
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functions of [the FHFA] as a conservator or a receiver.”132 Because
case law on HERA’s anti-injunction provision is admittedly “sparse,”133
courts have looked to a “nearly identical jurisdictional bar”134 contained
in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989 (“FIRREA”)135 for guidance.136 FIRREA’s anti-injunction
provision, contained in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j), applies to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and prevents judicial review
of the FDIC’s action as a conservator.137 This usage of FIRREA’s antiinjunction provision to inform HERA’s anti-injunction provision spells
disaster for Perry and other plaintiffs who seek equitable relief from the
Third Amendment.138
In the midst of the savings and loan crisis, Congress passed
FIRREA, amending the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950
(“FDIA”)139 to strengthen the FDIC’s authority to put troubled financial
institutions into conservatorship or receivership and to repudiate
contracts entered into by those depository institutions.140 In Freeman v.
FDIC,141 the D.C. Circuit found that the language of FIRREA’s
injunction bar “does indeed effect a sweeping ouster of courts’ power to
grant equitable remedies.”142 FIRREA’s anti-injunction provision bars
judicial review as long as the FDIC acts within its statutorily permitted
role as conservator or receiver.143 The D.C. Circuit read FIRREA’s antiinjunction provision as barring any court from granting non132. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f)
(2012).
133. Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *6.
134. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FHFA, 815 F. Supp. 2d 630, 641 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (referencing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j) (2012)).
135. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.);
Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *6.
136. Natural Res. Def. Council, 815 F. Supp. 2d at 641.
137. Id. at 641–42.
138. See Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *7 (“Counts in each of the Perry, Fairholme, and
Arrowood Complaints, and related prayers for relief, that claim APA violations for arbitrary
and capricious conduct . . . are hereby dismissed.”).
139. Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950 (FDIA), Pub. L. No. 81-797, 64 Stat. 873
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811–1835a (2012)).
140. Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *6 n.12 (discussing FIRREA’s enactment and the
“congressional intent to grant the FDIC enormous discretion to act as conservator or
receiver during the savings and loan crisis”).
141. 56 F.3d 1394 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
142. Id. at 1399.
143. Id.
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monetary remedies that would impede the FDIC in fulfilling its mandate
to wind up (as receiver) hundreds of insolvent savings associations.144
Referencing the Freeman opinion, Judge Lamberth notes that
the congressional intent behind FIRREA’s anti-injunction provision was
to allow the speedy resolution or “wind up” of hundreds of failed thrifts
Using FIRREA’s anti-injunction
with minimal interruption.145
provision from Freeman as the controlling standard, Judge Lamberth
determined that “the plaintiffs [did not] sufficiently plead that [the]
FHFA acted beyond the scope of its statutory powers or functions . . . as
conservator.”146 In the court’s view, the Third Amendment was merely
another conservator action that falls within the “extraordinary breadth of
HERA’s statutory grant to [the] FHFA.”147
The court found that because the FHFA acted within its
statutory authority to solve the circularity of payments problem,
discussed earlier,148 the manner in which the FHFA addressed that
problem is barred from judicial review.149 That conclusion left only one
question for the court to resolve: Whether the Third Amendment
Treasury was statutorily impermissible purchase of securities, and not
the permissible exercise of an existing contractual right.150
1. The FHFA Did Not Exceed its Statutory Authority
To evade HERA’s anti-injunction provision’s bar on inquiry
into the reasonableness of the Third Amendment, plaintiffs must
demonstrate that the Government acted in some way outside of its
statutory authority.151 Otherwise, the APA-based claims praying for
declaratory and equitable relief that plaintiffs rely on are barred because
they would “restrain or affect” the FHFA’s statutory powers to run the

144. Id.
145. Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *6 n.12.
146. Id. at *6.
147. Id. at *9.
148. See supra Part II.C.
149. See Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *9 (noting that HERA’s broad grant of power to

the FHFA, “coupled with the anti-injunction provision, narrows the Court’s jurisdictional
analysis to what the Third Amendment entails, rather than why [the] FHFA executed [it]”)
(emphasis in original).
150. Id. at *7–8.
151. Id. at *6, 8.
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GSEs.152 The reason HERA’s anti-injunction provision is such a
problem for plaintiffs is that the crux of the argument against the FHFA
is that the decision to enter into the Third Amendment was based on
concerns other than legitimate conservator duties.153 The real reason for
the Third Amendment, Perry claimed, was to begin the GSEs’ own
death spiral and prevent them from reentering the private sector.154 To
reach that argument, however, plaintiffs have to show that the FHFA
did not have the authority to make that decision under HERA.155 The
argument that the FHFA acted outside the power it was given as a
conservator is exceedingly difficult, given the broad terms in which
HERA grants power to the FHFA.156
Some agency decisions may be reached arbitrarily and
capriciously while remaining within the bounds of what the agency was
permitted to pass judgment on pursuant to its statutory authority.157
This is because, as the district court noted, the limit of an agency’s
statutory authority is not necessarily congruent to the standard of
finding an agency decision arbitrary and capricious.158 As long as the
FHFA can demonstrate that changing the dividend structure for the
GSEs’ payments to the Treasury was within its power to do, it matters
not how they went about doing it.159 This means that the FHFA is
permitted to escape review of what may well be arbitrary and capricious
decisions about the future of the GSEs—simply because it had the
power to make that decision.160 This creates an unreasonably thick

152. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f)
(2012). Any non-monetary relief sought—such as the nullification of a contract amendment
and an unwinding of the dividend structure—is action that would affect the conservator.
Opinion, supra note 3, at 12 (citing Freeman v. FDIC, 56 F.3d 1394, 1399 (1995)). The
District Court read FIRREA’s anti-injunction provision to be essentially identical to the
intent behind preventing non-monetary claims from interfering with the FHFA as
conservator. Id.
153. See Plaintiff Reply, supra note 65, at 1 (claiming that statements made in 2012
“reveal a very different rationale for the [Third Amendment]”).
154. See id. (quoting Government press releases on the plan to “wind up” the GSEs).
155. Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *9–10.
156. See id. (drawing the distinction between questioning the reasoning underlying the
Third Amendment and questioning whether the FHFA had the authority to enact it).
157. Id. at *7. The District Court opinion maintained that the D.C. Circuit, “implicitly
draws a distinction between acting beyond the scope of the constitution or a statute . . . and
acting within the scope of a statute, but doing so arbitrarily and capriciously.” Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at *9–10.
160. Id.
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layer of insulation for the FHFA from judicial review.
The FHFA will escape judicial review of its questionable
reasoning for the Third Amendment because in order to review that
reasoning, the plaintiffs are required to plead that the FHFA was not
permitted to consider any such action.161 To be sure, there are colorable
arguments that the FHFA knew the GSEs had a positive financial
outlook when the Third Amendment was enacted, and that they were
not at risk, immediate or otherwise, of exhausting their funding
commitments.162 To raise those issues, however, plaintiffs have to
demonstrate far more evidence than would be required for proving that
this action was arbitrary and capricious.
2. The Treasury Did Not Exceed its Statutory Authority
In order to evade HERA’s anti-injunction provision, the
Plaintiffs had to assert, as with their claims against the FHFA, that the
Treasury acted outside “the scope of its authority”163 by agreeing to the
Third Amendment. As was detailed earlier164 and discussed below, this
required Perry to advance two highly technical arguments in district
court that the Treasury exceeded its statutory authority.165 First, that the
Third Amendment was not the exercise of a contract right to which it
was entitled after December 31, 2009, and second, that the Third
Amendment was a purchase of securities in direct violation of 12 U.S.C.
Judge
§ 1455(l)(4), 1719(g) (HERA’s “Sunset Provisions”).166
167
Lamberth found neither argument persuasive.
Lamberth first addressed the argument that the Third
Amendment was not a permissible “exercise of rights” in connection
Id. at *6.
At the time the Third Amendment was entered into, Fannie Mae was regularly
meeting the 10% dividend obligation and had over $117 billion of remaining credit it was
able to draw from the Treasury. Fannie Mae Report 4Q12, supra note 58, at 2 (listing the
amount of remaining funding available at $117.6 billion). Likewise, Freddie Mac had
drawn a mere $71 billion at the time of the Third Amendment—a far cry from the “death
spiral” the FHFA was supposedly so concerned about. Freddie Mac Update, supra note 58,
at 13.
163. Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *7–9.
164. See supra Part III.
165. See infra Part III.A.1.
166. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1455(l)(4),
1719(g) (2012).
167. Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *8–9.
161.
162.
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with the existing preferred stock.168 A central premise in the argument
that the Third Amendment was a purchase of new securities is that the
Third Amendment was not an exercise of permissible contractual rights
inherent in the senior preferred stock that could be exercised after
December 31, 2009.169 HERA allows for the exercise of any right in
connection with the securities after December 31, 2009, as long as it is
not a purchase of additional senior preferred stock securities.170 The
two points are discrete, but interrelated. According to Lamberth,
however, the plaintiffs read the Sunset Provisions too narrowly.171 That
provision specifically exempts the holding or selling of the senior
preferred stock, and would also prevent the FHFA from exercising “any
provision within [the] Treasury’s contracts with the GSEs that requires
mutual assent,” according to Lamberth.172 In other words, the argument
went too far in asserting that the Sunset Provision would prevent any
and all activity requiring mutual assent.173
Predictably, Judge Lamberth was also unconvinced that the
Third Amendment can constitute a “purchase” of new securities.174
Using a plain language approach to the word “purchase,” Lamberth
found it determinative that the Treasury did not “grant[] the GSEs
additional funding commitments nor [did the Treasury] receive[] an
increased liquidation preference.”175 The telltale signs of a purchase
were absent, the determinative sign being consideration evidencing an
exchange.176 While the opinion makes passing reference to Perry’s
fundamental change doctrine arguments, the issue “strikes the Court as
straightforward” that there was no “purchase” of securities.177
Id. at *8.
See Plaintiff’s Reply, supra note 65, at 18 (arguing that the Third Amendment was
not an exercise of a contractual right to which the Treasury was entitled after December 31,
2009). This argument is important for the plaintiffs because if the amendment was simply
the exercise of a right stemming from the stock purchase agreements, which are contracts,
HERA would not bar the exercise of those rights since that would be permissible.
170. 12 U.S.C. § 1719(g)(2)(D).
171. Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *8.
172. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
173. Id. at *8–9.
174. Id.
175. Id. at *9.
176. See id. (noting that, aside from the complex arguments over the term “purchase,”
the fact that the Treasury did not “provide[] an additional funding commitment or receiv[e]
new securities from the GSEs as consideration” is further reason to disfavor finding a
purchase).
177. Id.
168.
169.
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Because the preliminary question of whether the Treasury acted
within its statutory authority to “exercise any right received in
connection with the PSPAs”178 is answered in the affirmative, the
manner in which it exercised that authority becomes irrelevant and
barred from review by the protections of HERA’s anti-injunction
provision.179 Thus, although the Treasury is not the conservator of the
GSEs, any judicial review of the substantive claims on how it acted in
connection with the GSEs’ conservatorship is barred.180
B.

Implications of HERA’s Anti-Injunction Provision

The FHFA and the Treasury have found too thick a layer of
insulation from judicial review in HERA’s anti-injunction provision.
That provision effectively insulates the Government from any review of
its actions when the FHFA invokes its conservator authority, and when
the review of the Treasury actions affect the FHFA as conservator in
any way.181 This is unfortunate for the Plaintiffs because many of the
strongest factual arguments that the FHFA and the Treasury acted
improperly, arbitrarily and capriciously, and to the detriment of private
shareholders182 may never be aired. A jurisdictional bar enacted to
“enable the FDIC and [RTC] to expeditiously wind up the affairs of
literally hundreds of failed financial institutions,”183 should not have the
same application and effect in the context of a previously private, but
now de facto state-run financial institution that shows no signs of being
wound up, “expeditiously” or otherwise.184 It is, however, ultimately
Congress who failed to incorporate more vigorous judicial review of the
FHFA’s actions—possibly because they never envisioned a neverending conservatorship of the GSEs and expected the conservatorship to
accomplish the fundamental goal of a “ ‘resumption of normal business
178. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), 12 U.S.C. § 1719(g)(2)(D)
(2012).
179. Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *7–9.
180. Id. at *7.
181. Id. at *7–8.
182. See Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶ 58–94 (making various factual allegations that the
FHFA was motivated by concerns other than its duties as the GSEs’ conservator).
183. Perry, 2014 WL 4829559, at *6 (alteration in original).
184. The GSEs have been in conservatorship since September 2008 and will likely
remain wards of the state until GSE reform measures at the Congressional level dictate their
future.
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operations.’ ”185
The immediate effect of this result for the Plaintiffs is
measurable. Many investors in GSE stock, especially common
stockholders, were smaller community banks and pension funds.186
Market reactions to Judge Lamberth’s ruling are powerful indicators of
what shareholders stand to lose if their bid to nullify the Third
Amendment is ultimately unsuccessful. The day after the cases were
dismissed, preferred shares in the GSEs with an approximately $33
billion face-value lost over 50% of their value, while common shares of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac dropped 37% and 38%, respectively.187
The favorable regulatory treatment (and categorization as Tier 1 capital)
of investments in GSE securities induced many investors seeking stable
and safe stocks to choose GSE common and preferred shares.188
Consequently, although sophisticated financiers like Perry may be
assuming the mantle for investors in GSE stock, a negative result could
have a drastic effect on smaller regional and community institutions.
As is often the case with litigation involving federal agencies
and great recession bailouts, opinions are mixed on whether the
dismissal is the proper and just outcome.189 Although some maintain
that “[t]he investors may have no better luck on appeal,”190 others
believe that the dismissal was a “misguided blockbuster,”191 and that
185.
186.

Plaintiff Reply, supra note 65, at 2 (citation omitted).
See Investor Rights, INVESTORS UNITE, http://investorsunite.org/the-issues/investor-

rights.
187. Margaret Cronin Fisk, Perry Capital Appeals Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Bailout
Ruling, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2014, 9:01 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-02/perry-capital-appeals-Fannie
Mae-Freddie
Mac-bailout-ruling.html.
188. See id. (citing Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep’t Office of Pub. Affairs, supra
note 36).
189. See Richard Epstein, The WSJ’s Improbable Defense of Judge Lamberth’s
Indefensible Decision in Perry Capital, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2014, 1:49 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardepstein/2014/10/02/godzilla-versus-the-thing-the-wallstreet-journals-improbable-defense-of-judge-lamberths-indefensible-decision-in-perrycapital (arguing that the decision was wrong and that the Wall Street Journal misinterpreted
the ruling and its precedential value). But see Godzilla Defeats the Thing, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
2, 2014, 6:51 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/godzilla-defeats-the-thing-1412204855
(recounting
the
decision and arguing that it represents a blow to other plaintiffs and is a victory for U.S.
taxpayers).
190. Fisk, supra note 187 (quoting Professor Peter Henning, Wayne State University).
191. Richard Epstein, Will Fannie and Freddie Shareholders Be Able to Set Aside the
Third Amendment? Judge Royce Lamberth’s Indefensible Decision Is Only One Battle in a
(Sept.
30,
2014,
4:59
PM),
Long
War,
FORBES
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“[p]ortions of Lamberth’s decision may be vulnerable on appeal.”192
Appealing the district court’s ruling will be “a lengthy process,”193 but
upholding the Third Amendment by way of an unreasonably high
jurisdictional bar will have far-reaching negative implications for the
rule of law.194
V. CONCLUSION
As Perry’s dismissal in district court demonstrated, HERA’s
anti-injunction provision is a crucial threshold in the analysis of claims
brought against the Government under the APA.195 While Judge
Lamberth’s interpretation of HERA’s anti-injunction provision appears
infallible, it may not be decisive.196 Judge Sweeney, presiding over
dividend sweep litigation in the Court of Federal Claims has continued
to grant discovery requests made by the plaintiffs while the case moves
closer to trial.197 Judge Sweeney, citing the same cases and reasoning as
Judge Lamberth, seems more able to envision a scenario in which
HERA’s anti-injunction provision does not bar those plaintiffs’
claims.198 Although the final outcome of dividend sweep litigation is
anyone’s call, it is apparent that plaintiffs bringing APA-based HERA
challenges of Government action in the future have a virtually
insurmountable task of clearing the HERA’s anti-injunction provision’s
bar on judicial review.
As unfair as it may seem, Perry and the myriad other investors
who felt assured that buying Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stock was a
http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardepstein/2014/09/30/will-fannie-and-freddieshareholders-be-able-to-set-aside-the-third-amendment-the-recent-sweeney-decision-willnot-alter-the-basic-dynamics.
192. Margaret Cronin Fisk et al., Fannie-Freddie Investors Fight on in Court of Claims,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 3, 2014, 3:00 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-03/fannie-freddie-investors-fight-on-incourt-of-claims (attributing the statement to Professor Steven Davidoff Solomon, University
of California at Berkeley School of Law).
193. Id. (quoting Bruce Berkowitz of Fairholme Capital Management LLC).
194. Epstein, supra note 189.
195. See Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 13-1025, 2014 WL 4829559, at *6 (D.D.C.
Sept. 30, 2014) (dismissing over half of the plaintiff’s claims as barred categorically by the
anti-injunction provision).
196. Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 365, 367 (2014).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 367 (“[B]lanket assertions concerning the court’s ability to conduct these
proceedings . . . hold no merit.”).
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safe investment199 are unlikely to prevail against the government on
appeal with APA-based claims. This is not because Perry and other
dividend sweep litigation plaintiffs have meritless cases.200 It is the
overly broad anti-injunction provision that will likely prevent judicial
review of the best substantive arguments available to dividend sweep
litigants bringing claims under the APA.201
Dividend sweep litigation may hold additional implications for
federal administrative agency powers, especially in the context of
conservatorships. If the FHFA, as conservator, can exercise the
broadest discretion in running the GSEs—surrendering all positive net
worth to the Treasury while purporting to “conserve their assets,” then
the definitional distinctions between conservators and receivers would
vanish.202 The FHFA, in abdication of its duties as conservator of the
GSEs, ensured that they would never retain their earnings, build capital,
or leave the clutches of its conservatorship—except by receivership or
an act of Congress.203 By claiming the Third Amendment necessary to
avoid insolvency, the FHFA seems to have ensured that the GSEs will
never escape conservatorship, and will continue to operate as a cashcow for the federal government.204 If allowed to evade real judicial
scrutiny, agencies acting as conservators might be allowed free-reign to
operate companies in conservatorship—altering deals as it pleases.
199. The government admitted as much in the press release regarding the need for the
initial senior preferred stock purchase agreement. “Investors have purchased securities of
[Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] in part because the ambiguities in their Congressional
charters created a perception of government backing.” Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep’t
Office of Pub. Affairs, supra note 36.
200. See supra Part IV.A.1.
201. See supra Part IV.B.
202. See Plaintiff Reply, supra note 65, at 3 (“[The] FHFA’s argument that it may ‘wind
down’ the [GSEs] in preparation for liquidation collapses any distinction between receivers
and conservators.”).
203. Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep’t Office of Pub. Affairs, Treasury Department
Announces Further Steps to Expedite Wind Down of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Aug.
17,
2012),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1684.aspx
(promising that “every dollar of earnings that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac generate will be
used to benefit taxpayers for their investment in those firms . . . and [Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac] will not be allowed to retain profits, rebuild capital, [or] return to the market
in their prior form”).
204. The Third Amendment ensured that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s return to
profitability would benefit taxpayers at the expense of the private shareholders in Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac. Conservators are charged with nursing troubled firms back to health
and return them to private enterprise, to the extent possible. The FHFA ensured that Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac could never satisfy its obligations to the Treasury and return to the
private sector.
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This result is unacceptable in the financial world. Predictability
and adherence to statutory mandates and intent must be favored if
governmental intervention in the private sector is to persist. Investors
must be able to reasonably predict the ramifications of governmental
intervention in private enterprise. A conservator who is allowed to
exercise such boundless power to shape a private company’s destiny at
whim will begin to look less like the noble savior Anakin Skywalker
and more like Darth Vader.
JOSEPH W. SILVA

